In the run-up to President Obama's descent on China, markets had worked themselves into a lather over the prospective appreciation of the renminbi, held at about 6.83 to the dollar since July last year, after three years of gains. Heads of the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank had called for a stronger renminbi to help smooth the imbalances manifest in the US trade deficit and Chinese trade surplus. China seemed game: a quarterly policy report last week from the central bank dropped a pledge to keep the currency “basically stable”. Last Thursday the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Group, meeting in Singapore, said it backed “market orientated exchange rates that reflect underlying economic fundamentals”.

Now reality bites. APEC, apparently more fearful of displeasing China than the US, dissolved on Sunday with nothing more than the usual platitudes over “sustainable” growth; the closing statements made no reference to currencies at all. On Monday, before Mr Obama had even uttered the c-word, a Chinese trade ministry spokesman said it was “unfair” to expect the renminbi to rise when the dollar's decline is making US goods more competitive. Non-deliverable forwards dropped, snapping a three-day gain.

However perplexing for politicians or investors who are long on renminbi forwards, China's position is entirely reasonable. Policy shocks are not what it needs. Exports dropped almost 14 per cent in October, the twelfth straight month of decline. Behind the bluster, policymakers are terrified of what the economy looks like without the full force of the state behind it. Investment in fixed assets accounted for almost 95 per cent of growth in gross domestic product in the first three quarters. Of that, “government-influenced” investment contributed almost half, on CEIC/World Bank estimates. Until Beijing gets a clear view of unassisted growth, external pressure to revalue will be the least of its worries.