As India enters its 64th year since independence, its economic dynamism presents a paradox. On most measures of market friendliness, it lags behind Latin America, and even sub-Saharan Africa. It is still more closed to trade and foreign capital than most other countries; still hampered by extensive controls on economic activity, including onerous labour laws; and still dominated by a large public sector. In short, it should be growing at 5 per cent, not 8? per cent, a year.

Long-run growth depends on the quality of supporting public institutions. True, the India of today is less of a regulatory nightmare than before the opening-up in 1991. Some institutions – those that hold elections, preserve financial stability and regulate telecommunications, for example – have worked well. But these exceptions apart, the state is weak and fraying. Policy reforms do not deserve the spectacular acceleration in growth that the economy has delivered.

Part of the problem is that Indian politics is getting progressively criminalised. The writ of the state does not run in nearly a quarter of its territory, with much of that area afflicted by violent insurrections. Corruption is endemic. And while India's high growth should have led to low debt, fiscal populism has ensured that India's public finances are almost as wobbly as those in the debt-addled industrial countries.