When I joined the People’s Bank of China’s Monetary Policy Committee in April 2010, I knew I was unprepared, despite teaching economics for nearly 20 years in the US and Hong Kong. In fact, few people could have been prepared: China has a large and mixed economy and its institutions are still young. The financial crisis made my task harder still, since it exposed the deficiencies in traditional macroeconomic theories.
我在2010年4月加入中國人民銀行貨幣政策委員會時,知道自己準(zhǔn)備不足,盡管我已經(jīng)在美國和香港教授經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)近20年。實(shí)際上,極少有人能做好準(zhǔn)備:中國經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模巨大、情況復(fù)雜,各項(xiàng)制度也還處在起步階段。金融危機(jī)讓我的任務(wù)更加困難,因?yàn)樗┞读藗鹘y(tǒng)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)理論的缺陷。