Is Germany becoming the new Gaullist state of Europe? It has fiercely opposed fully rescuing eurozone countries, forcing the EU repeatedly to act too little too late. Chancellor Angel Merkel has given up on nuclear energy, killing the possibility of a European energy policy. Germany shot down the EADS-BAE merger, missing an opportunity to create a global aerospace giant. And Ms Merkel, while proclaiming the need for a federalised eurozone, is stalling the implementation of a banking union. So, the argument goes: from now on, Germany is looking out only for its national interests and is not interested in Europe any more.

This argument is, however, shortsighted. Many Germans would take offence at the accusation of being bad Europeans. Since the creation of the EU, they have been paying their dues, both financially and politically. It is logical that having restrained its pursuit of national interest after the second world war, Germany should begin to define and defend such rights. What is surprising is that it has taken it so long to do it.

The more relevant question is will Germany become increasingly tempted to look towards the wider world – Russia, China and other emerging markets? For now, that would not be in Germany’s interest: more than half of Germany’s trade is with eurozone countries. In the future, though, its best outcome is less clear. Germany’s main European partners – Britain, Italy and France – must realise the stakes and be imaginative and determined in their vision of Europe. The more they can offer new ideas, the more they are in a position to conduct a constructive dialogue with Germany on Europe’s future. The stronger their economies, the more they can challenge Germany’s rigid vision of Europe’s monetary and fiscal policy.