After having enjoyed high approval ratings for nearly his entire first year in office, Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe may have finally undercut his government’s support when he pushed a controversial state secrets law through the Japanese Diet over the objections of opposition parties and thousands of demonstrators. His approval ratings fell more than 10 points to below 50 per cent in multiple opinion polls, largely on the basis of public unease about the powers over public information that the law grants to the state.
However, the secrecy law is unlikely to be the last struggle between Mr Abe’s government and the Japanese public over the state’s security powers. One year into Mr Abe’s term, it is increasingly clear that his ambitions extend far beyond rejuvenating Japan’s economy: he wants to introduce sweeping change to political institutions to steel Japan for competition with China. By removing formal and informal checks on executive power, he hopes to have a freer hand to answer military threats and compete for influence in East Asia.
Simply put, Mr Abe is working to transform the Japanese premier from a legislative manager into a commander-in-chief, perched atop a more robust defence establishment. The most significant change in this regard is the creation of a US-style national security council (NSC), which from next month will centralise defence and foreign policy, and crisis management, in a single office with a staff of 50. Half the NSC staff will be uniformed personnel, thereby institutionalising close interaction between the prime minister and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF). In fact, after just one year in office, Mr Abe has probably had more interaction with the JSDF than any of his predecessors: in addition to the two or three ceremonies regularly attended by earlier premiers, Mr Abe has been a regular visitor to JSDF bases and attended other JSDF functions in Tokyo. These prime- ministerial visits are clearly a conscious effort on his part to normalise the expanded commander-in-chief role.