I have to admit that I was not a big fan of the forced separation between investment banking and commercial banking along the lines of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US. I do not like restrictions to contractual freedom, unless I see a compelling argument that the free market gets it wrong. Nor did I buy the argument that the removal of Glass- Steagall contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. The banks that were at the forefront of the crisis – Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, Countrywide – were either pure investment banks or pure commercial banks. The ability to merge the two types was crucial in mounting swift rescues to stabilise the system – such as the acquisition of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan and of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America.
我必須承認，自己過去并不怎么認同《格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案》(Glass-Steagall Act)在美國國內強制分隔投資銀行業務與商業銀行業務的分業經營理念。我不贊成限制契約自由，除非能有強有力的證據使我相信自由市場機制存在問題。我也不同意有關廢除《格拉斯-斯蒂格爾法案》之舉促成了2008年金融危機的觀點。貝爾斯登(Bear Stearns)、雷曼兄弟(Lehman Brothers)、華盛頓互惠銀行(Washington Mutual)、Countrywide等受此次危機沖擊最大的銀行，都是純粹的投資銀行或純粹的商業銀行。允許銀行混業經營對于迅速出臺紓困措施以穩定金融體系至關重要：摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)對貝爾斯登的收購、以及美國銀行(Bank of America)對美林(Merrill Lynch)的收購就是例子。